Make Love, Not War: Do Single Young Men Cause Political Violence?
International Studies Quarterly
Contrary to popular conjecture, being single does not increase the probability that young men engage in political violence. Rather the evidence suggests that participating in political violence increases the probability that young men remain single, or that a third factor drives both participation in violence and marital status. Expand abstract »
The theory that single young men drive terrorism and civil war has been repeated in academic articles, diplomatic dispatches and the popular press. This paper tests the theory and finds that while the proportion of young men has a statistically-significant impact on political violence, whether or not these men are married has no additional impact. The result may initially appear to contradict the individual-level evidence that shows that the overwhelming majority of political violence is committed by young, unmarried men. However, if being a terrorist or a guerrilla caused men to be single, then this would explain why most terrorists and guerrillas are single. Moreover, given that terrorists and guerrillas make up only a small fraction of the population, if participating in political violence caused them to be single then this would have a negligible impact on a country’s proportion of single young men. As a result, the effect of young men would be the same as that of single young men. This theory would therefore explain both the individual-level evidence that those who participate in violence are single as well as the country-level regression results that the effect of single young men is identical to that of young men.
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| Replication files
HIV/AIDS, Life Expectancy, and the Opportunity Cost Model of Civil War
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Declines in life expectancy decrease the opportunity cost of dying in combat, thereby increasing the probability of civil war. Using the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa as a tragic natural experiment, the paper finds that a one-year increase in life expectancy decreases the probability of civil war by 2.6 percentage points. Expand abstract »
This paper views death in battle as an opportunity cost whose size is determined by the number of years a rebel would have lived as a civilian. As civilian life expectancy declines, this opportunity cost does too, increasing the probability of rebellion. The theory is tested with a tragic natural experiment: the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa. Using male circumcision rates as an instrument for life expectancy, the analysis shows that a one-year increase in life expectancy decreases the probability of civil war by 2.6 percentage points. This supports the theory that opportunity costs are important determinants of conflict onset and that non-pecuniary opportunity costs should be taken into account. The paper concludes by noting that cost-benefit analyses of public health interventions should include decreases in the probability of civil war, and the attendant benefits in terms of lives saved and material damage prevented, in their calculations.
Economic Considerations in Designing Emergency Management Institutions and Policies for Transboundary Disasters
Public Management Review
, 2013 with Adam Rose
This article provides an economic framework for designing transboundary emergency management institutions and policies to address transboundary crises. Expand abstract »
An increasing number of disasters are generating consequences that extend beyond political boundaries. This article provides an economic framework for designing transboundary emergency management institutions and policies to address these transboundary crises. It emphasizes the importance of economic considerations in two ways. First, we disaggregate economic losses into direct and indirect components, which vary in terms of their transboundary potential. Second, we apply economic principles such as scale economies, externalities and public goods in analysing European cooperation in emergency management. The article concludes by identifying the type of consequences that might best be addressed by a wider geographic and political authority.
Sanctioning the Homeland: Diasporas’ Influence on American Economic Sanctions Policy
Currently under peer review
How do diasporas affect sanctions policy towards their former homelands? This paper finds that a one-percentage-point increase in the size of a country's diaspora in states that are swing states in the U.S. presidential election increases the probability that the American government imposes sanctions on their former homeland by 11 percentage points. Using the size of a diasporas in swing states as an instrumental variable for the presence of sanctions shows that sanctions are ineffective at one of their key goals: causing regime change. Expand abstract »
Why do some immigrant groups succeed in getting the U.S. government to impose economic sanctions on their former dictators, while others do not? This paper begins by noting that the president is the pivotal player in sanctions policy and that presidents pander to voters in swing states. Therefore, the size of a diaspora’s voting block in swing states should determine whether the American government imposes sanctions on their former homeland. Considering dictatorships from 1946 to 2005, this paper finds that a one-percentage-point increase in the size of a country’s diaspora in swing states increases the probability of sanctions by 11 percentage points. It then goes on to calculate causal estimates of the effectiveness of economic sanctions on regime change. Using the size of diasporas in swing states as an instrumental variable for the presence of economic sanctions, it finds that sanctions do not have a statistically-significant impact on regime change.
| Online appendix